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CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, COMMON RESOURCES,
AND THE CLIMATE
Anthony Moffa*
Abstract
History, text, and precedent reveal an understudied and underutilized
source of constitutional authority for environmental protection—the
Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3. The Clause vests Congress with
the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”
This work re-examines these words, the context in which they were written,
and the limited judicial decisions interpreting them with an eye towards
increased congressional reliance on the Property Clause in the face of
daunting threats to our natural environment. Much prior scholarly
explanation of the Property Clause focused on the Framers’ concerns
about the land claims of various states, failing to consider any secondary
motivations that deepen our understanding of arguably the Constitution’s
most explicitly environmental provision. Eugene Gaetke and Peter Appel
began the push back against the originalist argument for a narrow
interpretation of Congress’s power under the Clause. This piece completes
the picture, making an affirmative case for a fuller, conservationist
original understanding, one that acknowledges the historic role of the
federal government in preserving the nation’s environment and natural
resources.
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Of all the questions which can come before this nation, short of the actual
preservation of its existence in a great war, there is none which compares
in importance with the great central task of leaving this land even a better
land for our descendants than it is for us . . . .
—President Theodore Roosevelt1
INTRODUCTION
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution simply and
unequivocally declares that “[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.”2 Interpreting this constitutional authority, the
Supreme Court famously said, “the power over the public land thus entrusted to
Congress is without limitations.”3 Environmentalists and scholars have thus for
years pointed to the Property Clause as a theoretical basis for legislating
environmental protection.4 And the so-called constitutional common law that
developed around the Property Clause provides support for their interpretation.5
Nonetheless, the majority of the statutes that comprise the field we have come to call
“environmental law,” including recent efforts to legislate solutions to the climate
crisis, do not claim the Property Clause as their primary source of authority.6

1

President Theodore Roosevelt, Address in Osawatomie, Kansas, New Nationalism
(Aug. 31, 1910), in Megan Slack, From the Archives: President Teddy Roosevelt’s New
Nationalism Speech, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Dec. 6, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.arc
hives.gov/blog/2011/12/06/archives-president-teddy-roosevelts-new-nationalism-speech
[https://perma.cc/AJX7-6WXS].
2
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
3
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S 529, 539 (1976) (citing United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
4
See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of
Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976).
5
See John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-First Century, 75 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1101, 1101 (2004) [hereinafter Leshy, A Property Clause] (describing a constitutional
common law of the Property Clause that “favors retention of federal land in national
ownership (retention), national over state and local authority (nationalization), and
environmental preservation (conservation).”).
6
The understudy and underutilization of the Property Clause is by no means limited to
environmental law. As Jeffrey Schmitt noted recently, “No leading [Constitutional Law]
textbook devotes a single case to the study of the Property Clause.” See Jeffrey M. Schmitt,
Limiting the Property Clause, 20 NEV. L.J. 145, 146, n.4 (2019) (citing as examples ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2017); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL
SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
742, 967–68, 1039 (7th ed. 2013)); see also Ronald F. Frank & John H. Eckhard, Power of
Congress Under the Property Clause to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law:
Will “Respecting Property” Go the Way of “Affecting Commerce”? 15 NAT. RES. LAW. 663,
664 (1983).
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The Property Clause, as its name suggests, has been consistently interpreted to
vest Congress with legislative authority to govern the property of the federal
government, as well as private property that affects it.7 Courts, particularly in the
twentieth century, have been steadfast in this understanding of the powers granted
by the somewhat unusual and arcane constitutional provision, upholding
congressional action that governs activity on private and state-owned land.8 Much
of the legislative activity, even the laws extending to private and state property,
could best be characterized as federal land management. Even as policy in that arena
shifted towards conservation, or at least mixed use, in the twentieth century, the
prevailing view accepted that the Property Clause encompassed those values.
The origins of the Property Clause at the founding, however, have (prior to this
work) consistently been wielded to cast doubt upon readings that ascribe to it the
modern-day values of environmentalism. Sharing an article with its immediately
preceding clause governing the admission of new states, the first mention of
anything resembling the Property Clause at the Constitutional Convention came in
that very context.9 The language of the Clause itself (“dispose of”) and contemporary
federal lands policy of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries suggested
further that the power vested in Congress would expand the treasury while
decreasing federal landholdings. Hence, the originalist understanding has been that
the Framers had two motivations in adopting the Property Clause (boundaries of
states and economics), neither of which resembled a conservationist ethos (even as
such a philosophy would have manifested at the time). Indeed, scholars, as recently
as Jeffrey Schmitt in 2019,10 have leaned on this understanding of constitutional
history to argue against the current status of Property Clause jurisprudence.
7
See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property
Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
8
See id. (citing United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061–62 (8th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, and cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1033 (2000); Minnesota ex rel.
Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249–51 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lindsey, 595
F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). But see Schmitt, supra note 6, at 174–86 (arguing
that a series of mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century Supreme Court cases adopted a
narrower, and in Schmitt’s proper, interpretation of Property Clause authority).
9
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321–22 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911), https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of1787-vol-2#Farrand_0544-02_2213 [https://perma.cc/5R6J-DD3B] (“The following
additional powers proposed to be vested in the Legislature of the United States having been
submitted to the consideration of the Convention . . . To dispose of the unappropriated lands
of the United States . . . To authorise [sic] the Executive to procure and hold for the use of
the United States landed property for the erection of forts, magazines, and other necessary
buildings . . . To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of
agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.”).
10
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 147 (“[T]he Court’s expansive interpretation of the
Property Clause is inconsistent with constitutional history, antithetical to structure principles
of federalism, and undesirable as a matter of policy. [The Article] therefore will present a
new approach to the Property Clause that both accommodates the reality of widespread
federal land ownership and imposes limits on federal regulatory power.”).
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This work sets out to re-examine and challenge that history of the Property
Clause with an eye towards increased Congressional reliance on it in the face of
daunting threats to our natural environment. For instrumental purposes,11 it will draw
on the theories of constitutional interpretation favored by the current Supreme Court
majority—most notably textualism12 and originalism.13 No one could seriously
question the primary motivations of the Framers, but that does not foreclose the
importance of searching for secondary motivations that deepen our understanding of
arguably the Constitution’s most explicitly environmental provision. Eugene
Gaetke’s work in the 1980s14 and Peter Appel’s work twenty years later15 laid the
groundwork for this Article’s argument by pushing back on the originalist argument
for a narrow interpretation of Congress’s power under the Clause.16 The argument
put forward in the pages that follow completes the picture, using the full
constitutional interpretation toolbox to lay out an affirmative case for a fuller,
conservationist original understanding, one that acknowledges the historical role of
the federal government in preserving the nation’s environment and natural
resources.
Part I describes in detail the professed constitutional basis for significant federal
environmental law, cataloging a consistent pattern of reliance on the Commerce
Clause. Parts II, III, and IV explain how the Property Clause’s origins, its history,
and the precedent interpreting it all support the case for greater reliance on it as the
constitutional basis for environmental legislation. To assuage concerns of those who
fear a broad interpretation of the Property Clause amounts to federal police power,
Part V offers a potential limit on its otherwise theoretically limitless authority. Part
11

This is to say this piece does not stake out a normative position on the relative merits
of the various theories of Constitutional interpretation. It is enough to acknowledge that
textualism and originalism have grown in influence and representation on the Supreme Court
in recent years, thus making arguments in those modes almost essential to practical success
on judicial review.
12
See Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan
on
the
Reading
of
Statutes,
YOUTUBE (Nov.
25,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/H8Z2-PZQM] (“[W]e
are all textualists now . . . .”).
13
See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, Election Law Originalism: The Supreme Court’s Elitist
Conception of Democracy, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 609, 611 (2020) (explaining that “at least
for some issues, the founding era is serving as an implicit baseline for the conservative wing
of the Court” and analyzing the effect of the “majority’s originalist orientation” on election
law).
14
Eugene Gaetke, Refuting the Classic Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617–
20 (1985).
15
See generally Appel, supra note 7 (proclaiming support for a broad interpretation of
the Property Clause).
16
This article does not engage with the argument, which recently reemerged in Utah,
that the entirety of federal land ownership and management is somehow unconstitutional.
John Leshy sufficiently disposes of that rather outlandish contention in a 2018 article. See
John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HAST. L. J. 499 (2018)
[hereinafter Leshy, U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?].
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VI argues that, even constrained by a limiting principle like the one suggested in the
previous part, the power vested in Congress through the Property Clause includes
the ability to address the climate crisis with comprehensive legislation. The final part
lays out the practical reasons why climate legislation should explicitly embrace the
Property Clause as its constitutional foundation.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The 1970s has a special place in the history of environmental law. In that
decade, Congress drafted and passed the sweeping legislation that would come to
occupy the field. Congress, of course, derived the power to pass those foundational
statutes from the Constitution. The question of which part of the Constitution did
not invite much controversy or debate.17 When some in the regulated industry
challenged the constitutionality of environmental laws, the Commerce Clause of
Article I, Section 8 emerged as the primary source of cited authority.18
The United States Supreme Court has declared unequivocally that “the power
conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional
regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards
that may have effects in more than one State.”19 At issue in that case, Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association, were the central provisions of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,20 but the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement swept much more broadly, embracing the whole environmental law
regime as a constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause authority. Nowhere in that
case, or any other case considering the constitutionality of environmental legislation
focused on the control of pollution,21 did the Court find that Congress’s regulatory
authority derived from the Property Clause of Article IV. That is true despite the fact
17

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XII, clause 7(c) of the Rules of United States
House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2011) (requiring that so-called “Constitutional
Authority Statements” accompany proposed legislation, did not yet exist; it was added in
2011).
18
See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 21 HARV. ENV’T. L.
REV. 1, 66 (2003).
19
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Recl. Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981).
20
30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
21
I use the phrase “environmental law” here rather narrowly, confining this discussion
to the statutes aimed at regulating polluters of air, water, and land. Legislation focused on
natural resource and public lands issues—extraction, allocation, management, and similar
subjects—certainly came with a more explicit grounding in the Property Clause. See, e.g.,
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529 (upholding the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid
exercise of Congress’s Property Clause authority). See also TODD AAGAARD, DAVE OWEN,
& JUSTIN PIDOT, PRACTICING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 117 (2017) (“To the extent
environmental resources are ‘Property belonging to the United States,’ the Property Clause
gives Congress broad authority to enact legislation to protect such resources. For natural
resources statutes that govern the management of federal lands and waters, this is a powerful
justification. . . . The Property Clause has less effect on pollution statutes, where
environmental resources are not generally owned by the federal government.”).
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that the Hodel plaintiffs explicitly argued that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act exceeded Congress’s Property Clause authority22 and that statute
could just as easily be characterized as a natural resource management vehicle as a
pollution control mechanism. The divergence of purposes—pollution control and
resource management—took on a constitutional dimension, suggesting a core
difference among a broad suite of laws that share the goal of environmental
protection. This split the statutes into two root systems, one with a much more
developed jurisprudence based on economic and political theories, the other
relatively underexplored.
The judicial recognition of the Commerce Clause as justification for legislation
that dictated the practices and behavior of wide swaths of the economy is
unsurprising on multiple fronts. For one, as constitutional law scholars have
meticulously chronicled and analyzed,23 the post-Lochner approach to Commerce
Clause jurisprudence dispatched with narrow conceptions of commercial and
economic activity, granting Congress a wide berth and deferring to its conclusions.
The practical result of that doctrinal development was an increased reliance on the
Commerce Clause as the proffered authority for legislation targeting new frontiers—
like the environment.
The importance of the post-Lochner Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
environmental jurisprudence cannot be understated and persists to this day. This is
despite more recent Commerce Clause cases curbing Congress’s authority.24 Courts
throughout the federal system—when confronted with constitutional challenges to
federal environmental statutes—cite the most prominent Supreme Court precedent
on the Commerce Clause. A recent challenge to the Clean Air Act by several states
is emblematic. In rejecting the states’ claim and upholding the constitutionality of
the Clean Air Act, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Commerce Clause itself and
Supreme Court precedent, including Darby, Wickard, and Lopez, among others.25
It was not only in court proceedings that environmental law offered the
Commerce Clause as its constitutional basis for existence. Within the halls of
22

See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275–76 (1981) (“Consequently, appellees contend that the
ultimate issue presented is ‘whether land as such is subject to regulation under the Commerce
Clause, i.e. whether land can be regarded as “in commerce.”’ In urging us to answer ‘no’ to
this question, appellees emphasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regulation is
within the inherent police powers of the States and their political subdivisions, and argue that
Congress may regulate land use only insofar as the Property Clause grants it control over
federal lands.”) (citations omitted).
23
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 458 (1989).
24
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (both citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Recl. Ass’n., Inc. favorably).
25
Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 180 (2015) (relying on
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce granted in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as
interpreted in C.J. Roberts’s opinion in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
549 (2012), and in other Commerce Clause jurisprudence including Darby, Wickard, and
Lopez).
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Congress itself, the subject of environmental regulation found its first home in
committees responsible for the regulation of commerce. In the early 1970s, the
Senate committee on the environment was actually a subcommittee of the
Committee on Commerce.26 That link between the economy and the environment
thus from the very beginning dominated the perspective of legislators, policymakers,
and jurists across all regulated natural media.
Indicative of this perspective, the text and legislative history of the Clean Air
Act includes multiple references to “interstate commerce.”27 Those references have
the sole purpose of establishing Congress’s jurisdiction to regulate air pollution via
its Commerce Clause authority; there would be no other reason to mention the
connection between emissions control and interstate commerce. The courts made the
same connection, describing “the activities that the EPA seeks to regulate [as] the
commercial, industrial, and extraction processes that produce . . . emissions.”28
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act described
above.29 Scholars that have since questioned the constitutional authority for the
Clean Air Act have likewise focused on the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority in the context of delegation to administrative agencies;30 no similarly
forceful or prominent arguments have focused on any potential Property Clause
justification for the protection of the air we collectively breathe.
The control of water pollution, like air pollution, has been repeatedly classified
as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Indeed, one of the Clean
Water Act’s most litigated and debated phrases—“waters of the United States”31—
has been defined, in the statute itself, in regulation, and in judicial precedent, by
reference to navigability for the purpose of making clear the connection to interstate
commerce. The debate in the House of Representatives on the passage of the 1972
Clean Water Act amendments included an explicit claim that “[t]he authority of
Congress over navigable waters is based on the Constitution’s grant to Congress of
26

See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1973: Hearing on S. 433 and S. 1735 Before the
Subcomm. on Env’t of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., I–II (1973).
27
See 115 CONG. REC. 30, 41269 (1969) (“The bill would provide authority . . . for the
Secretary to promulgate national emission standards for new and used aircraft, vessels, and
other vehicles capable of moving interstate commerce . . . to set national emission standards
for certain organic solvents, paints, and other oxidants which, because they are manufactured
and shipped in interstate commerce, cannot be effectively controlled at their point of use
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
28
Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 790 F.3d at 181 (2015).
29
See, e.g., Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 83 (2000) (“[T]he
power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional
regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that
may have effects in more than one State.” (quoting Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. at 282)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
30
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 332–33 (1999) (focusing on nondelegation in the context of regulating interstate
commerce).
31
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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‘Power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with Foreign Nations and among the several
States.’”32 The Senate Conference report likewise proclaimed that the phrase
“navigable waters” should “be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation”33—a clear reference to the connection between navigability and
interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court accurately described it, “neither this,
nor anything else in the legislative history . . . signifies that Congress intended to
exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation.”34
Even broadening the focus from navigable waters to all subjects of Clean Water
Act regulation, courts have consistently tied the limits of the federal government’s
power to the Commerce Clause. A District Court in Minnesota put it this way: “[i]t
is well-settled that Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate activities that cause water pollution and that may have interstate effects.”35
Thus, while federal jurisdiction over direct discharges is limited by the statutory
definition of ‘navigable waters,’ the appropriate framework for evaluating the
federal government’s power under the Clean Water Act to regulate indirect
pretreatment discharges into sewer systems and publicly owned treatment works is
provided by the Commerce Clause. The choice to interpret the Clean Water Act as
confined by the connection between water quality and interstate commerce was one
the Supreme Court made rather explicitly, rejecting a broader statutory reach. Justice
Stevens, dissenting in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, questioned that approach, asking, “Why should Congress intend that its
assertion of federal jurisdiction be given the ‘broadest possible constitutional
interpretation’ if it did not intend to reach beyond the very heartland of its commerce
power?”36 Justice Stevens argued that the water polluting activities governed by the
Act “have nothing to do with Congress’s ‘commerce power over navigation.’”37 The

32

118 CONG. REC. 33757 (1972) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (quoting
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
33
ENV’T POL’Y DIV. OF THE CONG. RSCH. SERV. OF THE LIBR. OF CONG., 93RD CONG.,
1ST SESS., A LEGIS. HIST. OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
(Comm. Print 1972).
34
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
197 n.3 (2001). See also 118 CONG. REC. 33757 (1972) (“Although most interstate commerce
150 years ago was accomplished on waterways, there is no requirement in the Constitution
that the waterway must cross a State boundary in order to be within the interstate commerce
power of the Federal Government. Rather, it is enough that the waterway serves as a link in
the chain of commerce among the States as it flows in the various channels of
transportation—highways, railroads, air traffic, radio and postal communication, waterways,
et cetera.”).
35
United States v. Rosenblum, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15957, at *22, *25 (D. Minn.
Mar. 3, 2008).
36
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Id.
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majority rejected that broader framing then and has maintained the Commerce
Clause justification for the Act since.38
Perhaps more explicitly than the other foundational environmental laws, the
Endangered Species Act described its effect within the statutory text itself as the
regulation of interstate commerce. Sections six, nine, and ten of the Act all use the
phrase “interstate commerce.”39 Like the Clean Air Act’s text and legislative history,
the references to interstate and foreign commerce limit the act’s reach so as to
coincide with the Commerce Clause. The emphasis on commerce in the Endangered
Species Act is interesting because, unlike controlling air and water pollution, which
generally involves instrumentalities of commerce, preservation of species involves
a host of strategies, many of which do not implicate commercial activity at all. And
even where the animals and plants themselves might be bought and sold in
commerce, the motivation for their preservation has nothing to do with the market
for them.
Courts considering the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, and
regulations enacted under it, have had to grapple with the at-times tenuous
connection between individual endangered or threatened species and interstate
commerce. Many such species have habitats that do not cross state borders and have
no commercial value. Confronted with those situations, rather than rely on
38

See id. at 181–82 (citations omitted) (internal quotation omitted) (“The majority’s
reading drains all meaning from the conference amendment. By 1972, Congress’ Commerce
Clause power over ‘navigation’ had long since been established. As we recognized in
Riverside Bayview, the interests served by the statute embrace the protection of ‘significant
natural biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat, and nesting,
spawning, rearing and resting sites’ for various species of aquatic wildlife. For wetlands and
‘isolated’ inland lakes, that interest is equally powerful, regardless of the proximity of the
swamp or the water to a navigable stream. Nothing in the text, the stated purposes, or the
legislative history of the CWA supports the conclusion that in 1972 Congress
contemplated—much less commanded—the odd jurisdictional line that the Court has drawn
today.”).
39
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884, Sec. 6, Part (f) (“Any
State law or regulation which applies with respect to the importation or exportation of, or
interstate or foreign commerce in, endangered species or threatened species is void to the
extent that it may effectively (1) permit what is prohibited by this Act or by any regulation
which implements this Act, or (2) prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or
permit provided for in this Act or in any regulation which implements this Act.” (emphasis
added)); id. at Sec. 9, Part (a) (“[I]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States to . . . (E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign
commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial activity, any such
species; (F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species”
(emphasis added)); id. at Sec. 10, Part (c) (“Non-edible byproducts of species taken pursuant
to this section may be sold in interstate commerce when made into authentic native articles
of handicrafts and clothing; except that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
any non-native resident of an Alaskan native village found by the Secretary to be not
primarily dependent upon the taking of fish and wildlife for consumption or for the creation
and sale of authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing.”).
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constitutional authority other than the Commerce Clause, like the Property Clause,
courts have leaned heavily on the aggregation jurisprudence stemming from the
famous Wickard case.40 The jurisprudence continues to describe the Endangered
Species Act as “an economic regulatory scheme.”41 Scholars have likewise defended
the Endangered Species Act as an appropriate exercise of Commerce Clause
authority,42 rather than turning to the Property Clause, which fits the structure and
purpose of the Act more neatly.
With respect to toxic waste, the constitutional dimension of the debate over
whether and how the federal government should step in to mandate cleanup of
contaminated sites and prevent future contamination focused exclusively on the
Commerce Clause. The hearings on both the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) in the House of Representatives included lengthy
discussions of Congress’s authority and (according to some) duty43 to regulate the
interstate transport of waste and preempt state law on the subject. Before RCRA was
passed, one congressman proclaimed:

40

See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“Cave Species takes may be aggregated with all other ESA takes. As noted, plaintiffs
concede such aggregation substantially affects interstate commerce. In sum, application of
ESA’s take provision to the Cave Species is a constitutional exercise of the Commerce
Clause power.”); See also Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 507–08 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding the
ESA on Commerce Clause grounds).
41
GDF Realty Invs., 326 F.3d at 640–41.
42
See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands FlowerLoving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 214 (1998); Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The
Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt,
79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 873 (2001).
43
See Symp. on Res. Conservation and Recovery: Printed for Use of Subcomm. on
Transp. and Com. of H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com., 94th Cong. 57 (1976)
(statement of David T. Bardin, N.J. State Env’t Prot. Agency), reprinted in 26 RCRA,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION & RECOVERY ACT OF 1976 (1976)
(“[W]e strenuously oppose the notion that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution obliges
a State to open its land to be used as a dumping ground to be filled with other States [sic]
solid wastes.”); see also Superfund: Hearings on H.R. 4571, H.R. 4566, and H.R. 5290
Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Com. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com.,
96th Cong. 248–49 (1979), reprinted in 54 CERCLA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
(1979) (statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Adm’r for Water and Waste Materials).
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[I]t is high time that this Congress corrected to use the commerce clause,
to discourage the proliferation of unnecessary solid wastes, to encourage
the recycling of materials, to encourage the recovery of energy value of
the wastes that we must produce, to encourage the recovery of resources
and to meet the real problems, not only of our metropolitan areas but of
our economy as a whole.44
Much of the discussion concerning RCRA and CERCLA centered on the preemption
of state law—with expressions of reticence from representatives and agency
personnel testifying before them.45 Despite these federalism concerns, no one
expressed doubt in the authority of Congress to regulate the field under the
Commerce Clause. Instead, the argument concerned how best to facilitate, rather
than inhibit, interstate commerce.46 Courts have routinely upheld both statutes as
proper exercises of Commerce Clause authority, even as they apply to contamination
that never crosses state lines.47 The doctrinal rationale offered by the federal courts
was that “unregulated management of hazardous substances, even strictly within
individual states, significantly impacts interstate commerce . . . .”48 This line of
reasoning exemplifies the post-Lochner era’s expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause.
On the subject of useful, rather than wasteful, toxic chemicals, congressional
action was also predicated on the Commerce Clause. Of all the foundational
environmental statutes, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) perhaps fit most naturally in
the category of commercial regulation. Both acts govern the use, sale, and
distribution of products for which substantial national markets exist. The legislative
history of both statutes evidences widespread recognition of this fact and, as a
consequence, reflects careful discussions about how much, if anything, to leave to
44

Id. at 55.
See, e.g., Superfund: Hearings on H.R. 4571, H.R. 4566, and H.R. 5290 Before the
Subcomm. on Transp. and Com. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com., 96th Cong.
256 (1979), reprinted in 54 CERCLA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (1979)
(statement of Barbara Blum, Deputy Adm’r, Env’t Prot. Agency, Accompanied by Thomas
C. Jorling, Assistant Adm’r for Water and Waste Mgmt) (“I think it is clear that our agency’s
position has historically been one of not seeking preemption of any State authority in the
environmental field. We hope that we can come up with a mechanism on the spill side which
would preserve as much of the activities of the State of New Jersey and those of other States
as is possible without generating the types of concerns expressed most specifically by
industry that they are being double-charged, that they are paying twice for the same relief
and the same service from the Government and that the complexities of the impact on
interstate commerce are so high as to dictate preemption.”).
46
See id. at 256 (“That is a delicate area. We hope we can come up with one which
achieves the purposes of the Government as well as those of interstate commerce.”).
47
See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
CERCLA was constitutional as applied to intrastate disposal of hazardous waste).
48
See id. at 1510.
45
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the states.49 In the end, both TSCA and FIFRA left some room for states to regulate
more stringently, but set floors deemed necessary for human health and safety.50
The text and legislative history of our foundational environmental laws, as well
as the judicial precedent interpreting them, clearly indicates a belief that they are
grounded in the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. That
interpretation has indeed contributed to the statutes’ resilience in the face of
numerous allegations of unconstitutionality over the decades. However, grounding
environmental protection in economic regulation, rather than, say, conservation of
nature, also comes at a cost—both in the reach of the law and its expressive function.
The following parts explain why paying that cost is needless and argue that the
Property Clause provides an alternative conservation-minded source of
constitutional authority.
II. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AT THE FOUNDING
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation proclaimed that “no [S]tate shall be
deprived of territory for the benefit of the [U]nited [S]tates.”51 In the abstract, this
principle sounds rather innocuous. However, it was included at the behest of seven
so-called “landed” states—colonies whose royal charters extended west to the
Mississippi River or the Pacific Ocean—to preserve their claims to that territory.52
49

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 137 (1976) (“Traditionally States have been most
sensitive to the health concerns of their citizens. As a consequence, States have been granted
wide latitude under the Commerce clause of the Constitution to act on behalf of their citizens
even when those regulated are marketing their products through the channels of interstate
commerce. Congress has also enacted legislation which liberally defines the role of the States
in important health and safety laws.”).
50
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 92-511, at 14 (1971) (“The Congress hereby finds that
pesticides are valuable to our Nation’s agricultural production and to the protection of man
and the environment from insects, rodents, weeds, and other forms of life which may be
pests; but it is essential to the public health and welfare that they be regulated closely to
prevent adverse effects on human life and the environment, including pollution of interstate
and navigable waters; . . . and that regulation by the Administrator and cooperation by the
States and other jurisdictions as contemplated by this Act are appropriate to prevent and
eliminate the burdens upon interstate or foreign commerce, to effectively regulate such
commerce, and to protect the public health and welfare and the environment.”).
51
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 2.
52
See Motion Regarding the Western Lands, [6 September] 1780, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://Founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-02-02-0051
[https://perma.cc/EX4A-CQVC] (last visited July 24, 2021) (describing the position and
listing the landed states as “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia”). The sheer brazenness of the colonies to claim
ownership and control over lands that had for centuries been the home of indigenous peoples
of this continent deserves some mention here. The significance of the colonialist and racist
roots of the United States system of law and government is not the subject of this work but
has received increased attention elsewhere. See, e.g., NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, SETTLER
COLONIALISM, RACE, AND THE LAW: WHY STRUCTURAL RACISM PERSISTS (2020).
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The remaining six states opposed those claims, arguing that states should cede to the
central government any territory west of the Appalachian Mountains.53 One strong
argument in favor of cession was relative equality of geographic jurisdiction, and
therefore political influence, among the states.54 Another was the dire need for
federal funds to pay the debts incurred fighting the Revolutionary War. Even James
Madison, champion of “landed” Virginia, acknowledged the potential importance of
ceded territory as a common resource.55 Rather than resolve these competing land
claims in the Articles of Confederation themselves, the Congress encouraged the
cession of territory by the states and resolved that “the unappropriated lands that
may be ceded or relinquished to the United States . . . shall be disposed of for the
common benefit of the United States and be settled and formed into distinct
republican states, which shall become members of the federal union.”56 The
following year, in 1781, the Articles were ratified without the issue being fully
resolved. And Virginia’s attempt to make a qualified cession of territory, despite
passage by the state assembly in 1781,57 was not immediately accepted by
Congress.58
The ensuing failure of our first constitution can, in part, be attributed to the
uncertainty surrounding these land claims and the resultant lack of central
government resources, including land. The aforementioned Virginia cession is
instructive—the Virginia Compact codifying the cession makes explicit reference to
a series of triggering events beginning in 1781 and concluding after the ratification

53

See Motion Regarding the Western Lands, supra note 52.
See id.
55
See id. (Moving, among other things, “[t]hat all the Lands to be ceded to the United
States and not appropriated or disposed of in bounties to the American Army shall be
considered as a common Fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have
become or shall become Members of the Confederation”).
56
LIBR. OF CONG., 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 915
(Gaillard Hunt ed., Wash. Gov’t Printing Office 1910) (1780).
57
See VA. CODE ANN. § 1-303 (1950); Thomas Jefferson, From Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Huntington, 17 January 1781, enclosing Resolution of Assembly concerning the
Cession of Lands, 2 January 1781, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Jan. 17, 1781),
https://Founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0481 [https://perma.cc/N8P5JT6M] (last visited July 24, 2021).
58
See Editorial Note: The Virginia Cession of Territory Northwest of the Ohio, NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-02-0419-0001
[https://perma.cc/7S4V-7H2M] (“A few leaders, such as George Mason, James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Joseph Jones, Benjamin Harrison—some of whom
were far from being disinterested themselves—led the three-year fight to yield in the national
interest a vast tract of territory for which the state had a more defensible title than most other
western claims.”).
54
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of the United States Constitution.59 The Property Clause of the United States
Constitution has its origins in this story of a resource-deprived federal government.60
In 1787, the debate over the legislative powers of the federal government raged
fiercely. Parts of that debate concerned the ability to regulate the lands held and
acquired—what would become the Property Clause. Nonetheless, contemporary
accounts of the Constitutional Convention, most notably the notes of James
Madison, suggest that the conversations on this particular subject were not nearly as
heated or extensive as the discussions of what were perceived as more controversial
powers.61 The cession of lands by the original states to the federal government, now
understood as necessary for the preservation of the union, importantly distinguished
the reach of the constitutional central government from the previous one under the
Articles of Confederation;62 however, there was limited discussion concerning how
the power over them might be used.63
59

See Va. Code Ann. § 1-303 (“The territory northwest of the Ohio River ceded by the
Commonwealth shall be and remain the same as provided by: 1. An act of the General
Assembly passed on January 2, 1781 . . . . 2. An act of the General Assembly passed on
December 20, 1783 . . . . 3. An act of the General Assembly passed on December 30, 1788,
whereby, after referring to an ordinance for the government of the territory, passed by the
United States Congress on July 13, 1787 . . . .”).
60
See Leshy, U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, supra note 16, at 504–06
(describing the early history of federal public lands acquisition (by cession) and management
embodied in four documents: “the October 10, 1780 Resolution of Second Continental
Congress that urged the states with western land claims to cede them to the United States . . .
Virginia’s 1784 cession to the United States of the western lands it claimed . . . the famous
Northwest Ordinance adopted by the Congress of the Confederation in 1787. . . [and] the
United States Constitution, which replaced the Articles of Confederation in 1788.”).
61
See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of1787-vol-1#preview [https://perma.cc/U567-JMXS] (containing 18 instances of the word
“lands” compared to 265 instances of the word “representation”—a much debated issue with
respect to the composition of the legislature); see also Schmitt, supra note 6, at 154
(“Original intent . . . does little to clarify the meaning of the Property Clause. There is simply
no record of the Founders discussing the power of Congress to regulate federal land within
an existing state. In fact, the records of the Constitutional Convention contain little debate
over any aspect of the Property Clause.”).
62
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2020)
(“The original states reluctantly ceded the lands to the developing new government. This
cession, together with granting constitutional powers to the new federal government,
including the authority to regulate federal property and to create new states, played a crucial
role in transforming the weak central government under the Articles of Confederation into a
stronger, centralized federal government under the U.S. Constitution.”); see also Appel,
supra note 7, at 23 (2001) (“[T]he history reveals that the western lands, the question of who
should control them, and the eventual decision to vest that authority in the United States
rather than the individual states received significant attention from the Continental
Congress.”).
63
See Leshy, A Property Clause, supra note 5, at 506 (“The Property Clause did not
provoke significant discussion at the Constitutional Convention.”).
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One of the few explicit references to the idea of granting Congress the power
over federal lands simply listed “additional powers proposed to be vested in the
Legislature of the United States,” many of which concerned the governance of real
and intellectual property.64 The proposed authority over real property included the
power “[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States” and “[t]o
authorise [sic] the Executive to procure and hold for the use of the United States
landed property for the erection of forts, magazines, and other necessary buildings”
and “[t]o establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of
agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.”65
At first blush, these powers sound rather mundane and even ministerial. Indeed,
at least one constitutional scholar who has looked at the contemporary records
contends that the delegates to the Convention conceived of public land management
as an administrative, rather than legislative, function.66 This argument finds
additional support in the Convention’s decision to locate the Property Clause in
Article IV, rather than with the other legislative powers in Article I. As the role of
administrative law has grown in prominence since the founding, this may be a
distinction without a practical difference. Regardless of the nominal conception of
federal lands policymaking as legislative or administrative, one could read the
proposed powers as reflecting a deeper appreciation of the federal government’s
responsibility as steward of common resources. For instance, the establishment of
public institutions for the promotion of agriculture and the acquisition of land for
necessary buildings are two prominent functions of modern public land governance
as delegated by Congress to the Bureau of Land Management,67 the National Park
Service,68 and United States Department of Agriculture.69
Further supporting the notion that the Founders understood the Property Clause
to convey significant authority to Congress is their conscious decision not to place

64

See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 322 (listing,
among other things, the power “[t]o grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public
good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent; [t]o secure
to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time; [t]o establish an University; [t]o
encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries; . . . [t]o grant patents for useful inventions; [t]o secure to authors exclusive rights
for a certain time”).
65
Id.
66
See Lance F. Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property Clause: Implications for
Judicial Review of National Monument Reductions, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 761, 781–82
(2019) (“[T]he Convention did not conceive of the management of property as a legislative
power. Rather, it remained administrative. As such, it was separated from more traditional
legislative functions. Public lands management was, and remains to this day, an
administrative power housed in Congress.”).
67
See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (1976).
68
See National Park Service Organic Act, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as
amended at Pub. L. No. 108–352).
69
An Act to establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 71, 12 Stat. 387 (1862).
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the Clause within the Article II purview of the executive branch.70 The ratified
language of Article IV’s Property Clause explicitly acknowledges that public lands
policy involves more than just acquisition and disposal, implicitly endorsing a
stewardship role for Congress. In addition to transactional authority, the Clause tasks
Congress with “mak[ing] all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States.”71 This language clearly
contemplates more active management than even the proposed powers listed by the
draft committee and reproduced above. Even scholars who argue for a narrow
interpretation of the Clause concede that its text, according to original and
contemporary understanding, grants Congress some version of police power with
respect to federal land.72
What remains unclear from the text is just what the Founders envisioned as
“needful” when it came to managing and protecting government property. The word
could be read as alternatively permissive and restrictive. Those who read it as
limiting suppose that the Framers simply intended to continue the status quo vision
of federal land policy, with the federal government acting largely as a transitional
police authority over territory before new states were established in it.73 That view
attributes too little foresight to the Founders—men who had just watched an underresourced, un-landed constitutional government fail rather unceremoniously.
In the Federalist Papers, famously authored to convince states to ratify the
Constitution, both Hamilton and Madison offer some limited insight on the point of
federal land policy. In the Federalist No. 43, Madison recounts a version of the text
of the Property Clause itself and describes the power conveyed by it as “a power of
very great importance.”74 He goes on to argue the vesting of this power in the federal
government as necessary for the management of the yet unexplored western
territories, preempting debate among various states that may lay claim to the
governing of said territories.75 The focus on quashing the competing jurisdictional
70

Lance F. Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property Clause: Implications for
Judicial Review of National Monument Reductions, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 761, 781 (2019)
(“[T]he Convention did not want the public domain managed by the President out of concern
that it was too much power in one person’s hands.”).
71
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
72
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 154 (“In sum, the Property Clause, when read in context,
could be read to grant Congress either: (1) an unlimited regulatory power over federal land,
or (2) a more limited regulatory power that does not include the power to preempt contrary
state legislation with respect to land within a state.”).
73
See id. at 155 (“The framers therefore sought to facilitate the continuation of the
federal land policy that had existed under the Articles of Confederation. Three relevant
principles governed this policy: (1) the federal government would have an unlimited
regulatory power over the federal territories (outside the borders of any state), (2) the new
states would be equal in sovereignty to the old, and (3) the United States would retain land
within the new western states.”).
74
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 211 (James Madison) (Floating Press ed., 1783).
75
See id. (arguing the Property Clause “was probably rendered absolutely necessary,
by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory, sufficiently known to the
public”).
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claims of the states to new territories, particularly in the West, is a theme that
pervades the discussion of the Property Clause throughout the essays of both
Hamilton and Madison.
In Federalist No. 7, Hamilton recounts “serious and animated discussion
concerning the right to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the
Revolution.”76 He correctly asserts that states compromised under the Articles of
Confederation, settling on the view that those ungranted lands transferred from the
Crown to the federal government of the United States at the signing of the Treaty of
Paris.77 Hamilton goes on to emphasize the importance of maintaining the “Western
territory” as “the common property of the union,” arguing the importance of federal
control to avoid inconsistent principles of management and apportionment, as well
as interstate hostility.78 That extended argument could rightly be classified as the
first documented argument for the conservation of federal landholdings, albeit
protecting them from state, rather than private, acquisition.
James Madison, in the Federalists Nos. 14 and 41, argues forcefully in favor of
a strong union and in support of the particular distribution of powers and
responsibilities among levels and branches of government. Madison urges that the
union is necessary as the “conservator of peace” and “guardian of our . . . common
interests.”79 This passage is notable for two reasons. First, we see in it a very early
usage of the idea of government as an agent of conservation, albeit conservation of
a peaceful and tranquil state of affairs, rather than nature. Second, Madison
acknowledges the existence of, and, more importantly, the value of protecting,
commonly held resources, many of which, especially at this time, were natural. The
recognition of the importance of central government to the preservation of
commonly held property ties Madison’s line of reasoning back to Roman and natural
law,80 which is where, not coincidentally, we find the roots of the public trust
doctrine.81
One can understand the Property Clause as an acknowledgment of the natural
law obligation of states to preserve and protect common resources. Both Madison
and Hamilton, along with a good number of the Founders, were noted subscribers to

76

THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Floating Press ed., 1783).
See Treaty of Paris, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Sept. 3, 1783, 12 Bevans 8.
78
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, supra note 76, at 44–45 (Alexander Hamilton).
79
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 94 (James Madison) (Floating Press ed., 1783).
80
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book II, Title I (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913)
(“[N]ow let us proceed to the law of Things. Of these, some admit of private ownership,
while others, it is held, cannot belong to individuals: for some things are by natural law
common to all, some are public, some belong to a society or corporation, and some belong
to no one.”).
81
See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012) (“The public trust
doctrine is of ancient origin. Its roots trace to Roman civil law and its principles can be found
in the English common law on public navigation and fishing rights over tidal lands and in
the state laws of [the United States of America].”); see generally Bruce W. Frier, The Roman
Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641 (2019).
77
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the theory of natural law.82 Madison wrote of a legal duty “precedent, both in order
of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”83 Hamilton
specifically espoused belief in “the law of nature,” defined as “an eternal and
immutable law, which is indispensably obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any
human institution whatever.”84 Whether or not one ascribes to a natural law theory
of the Constitution, it is difficult to ignore the theory’s influence on the document’s
drafters, particularly when interpreting their words. In the context of the Property
Clause, that influence suggests that “needful rules and regulations” would be those
that ensure the preservation of the common property resources of the United States
for use and enjoyment by citizens in perpetuity. And further, the writings of Justinian
place air and water among those common resources.85 Thus, the Property Clause
could quite reasonably be read to constitutionally empower Congress to enact
legislation for the purpose of maintaining a healthy, sustainable environment. At the
very least, the protection of these resources as they exist on federal lands would
constitute a permissible exercise of congressional authority.
III. FOUNDING ERA USE OF PROPERTY CLAUSE AUTHORITY
As others have recently and belatedly noted,86 the lack of debate concerning the
Property Clause in the late eighteenth century did not translate to a dearth of
congressional action pursuant to the Clause in the early nineteenth century. Alas,
much of the earlier congressional action under the Property Clause dispatched into
private hands, rather than preserved, federal lands. Owing no doubt to the attitude
of the times, federal landholdings in the West were put forward as opportunities for
new, enterprising citizens. The federal government also saw in this policy the
prospect of revenue generation at a time when precious few sources of funds were
available.87
82

See Robert S. Barker, Natural Law and the United States Constitution, 66 REV. OF
METAPHYSICS 105, 109 (2012) (“The most influential Founders of the United States
Constitution saw God as the source of the supreme rules of law and government, and applied
the Natural Law in their work in the 1787 Constitutional Convention.”).
83
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987).
84
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 55, 62 (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1904).
85
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 80 (“Thus, the following things are by
natural law common to all—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the seashore.”).
86
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 158 (noting that “the issue of Congress’s regulatory
authority over federal land within the states . . . emerged repeatedly in Congress during the
early nineteenth century” and arguing that scholars have largely ignored this historical
evidence, instead focusing on the meager accounts of debates at the founding and later
Supreme Court precedent).
87
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Revenue Act of 1861, Act of August 5, 1861,
Chap. XLV, 12 Stat. 292 (imposing the first federal income tax).
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Congress established the General Land Office (GLO) as an agency housed
within the Department of the Treasury in 1812, vesting it with the authority to
“superintend, execute and perform, all such acts and things, touching or respecting
the public lands of the United States.”88 The GLO continued the work of disposing
of western lands that predated the Constitution.89 Congress implicitly signaled its
approach to land policy, and thereby the Property Clause, when it chose to place the
GLO within the Treasury Department. That move signaled two important things.
First, Congress saw the chief public benefit of federal landholdings as revenue
generation.90 Second, Congress did not embrace stewardship of common resources
as an important function of the then-constituted federal government, instead
prioritizing the “settlement” of as much territory as possible.91
These perspectives on common resources were widely shared among early
citizens and thinkers.92 A lone dissenting voice resonated from jurist and scholar St.
George Tucker, who argued that “[t]he western territory ought to be regarded as a
national stock of wealth.”93 Tucker advocated for limited disposal of federal lands,
sufficient only to raise revenue necessary to pay current debt, and favored retaining
the rest of the property as a common resource.94 This view sounds much more
consistent with a stewardship ethos. And, practically speaking, it is. Upon closer
examination, however, Tucker’s rationale for limiting disposal emerges as having
little to do with conservation and much more to do with a concern that a bloated
federal treasury would lead to an increasingly intrusive and potentially tyrannical
centralized government.95
88

An Act for the Establishment of a General Land-Office in the Department of the
Treasury, ch. 68, 2 Stat. 716 § 1 (1812); see also MILTON CONOVER, THE GENERAL LAND
OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 3 (1923) (describing the creation of
the General Land Office).
89
See generally Land Ordinance of 1785, reprinted in 2 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF
THE U.S., THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO 12 (Clarence Edwin Carter, ed.,
1934) (allowing settlers to purchase land in undeveloped parts of the country).
90
See Lance F. Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property Clause: Implications for
Judicial Review of National Monument Reductions, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 761, 775 n.48
(2019) (“By placing responsibility for land policy within the Department of the Treasury,
Congress underscored the revenue-raising nature of federal lands.”).
91
See generally GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1993) (arguing that American individualistic drive for westward expansion was a significant
cultural attitude at the time of the American Revolution and continued into the 1800s).
92
See, e.g., President Thomas Jefferson, U.S., First Inaugural Address, (Mar. 4, 1801)
in 1 AM. STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELS. 56 (describing the country as encompassing “a wide
and fruitful land” with “room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth
generation”).
93
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 285 (Philadelphia, Birch & Small, 1803).
94
See id. at 283–84.
95
See id. at 283–86 (“To amass immense riches to defray the expenses of ambition
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Historical accounts of the GLO’s activity describe an agency struggling to
manage the rapid, speculative westward expansion of the United States.96 The
GLO’s policies facilitated easy, private acquisition of federal lands. A system of
credit offered to enterprising citizens looking to acquire undeveloped property
became increasingly burdensome for GLO to administer and encouraged wild
speculation, as the United States government lost out on both land and, alarmingly,
the continuing payments meant to compensate it for that land.97 The records,
including statements of President Jackson, indicate that the priorities of the agency
centered on surveying more and more land for sale and ensuring proper accounting
of such transactions;98 nowhere is the preservation of valuable government assets,
let alone conservation, mentioned as part of the GLO’s mission.
In 1845, the Supreme Court had occasion to opine on the federal government’s
responsibility, and authority, to regulate activity on public lands in newly forming
states. In dicta in the case of Pollard v. Hagan, the Justices wrote that they
. . . think the United States hold the public lands within the new states by
force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes connected with them, and
not by any municipal sovereignty which it may be supposed they possess,
or have reserved by compact with the new states, for that particular
purpose [and that] the [Property Clause] shows that no such power can be
exercised by the United States within a state.99
Jeffrey Schmitt calls this language “highly persuasive” in making the case for a
narrow interpretation of Property Clause authority.100 It is more appropriately cast,
however, as merely reflective of the general attitude towards federal landholdings at
when occasion may prompt, without seeming to oppress the people, has uniformly been the
policy of tyrants. Should such a policy creep into our government, and the sales of land,
instead of being appropriated to the discharge of former debts, be converted to a treasure in
a bank, those who can at any time command it, may be tempted to apply it to the most
nefarious purposes.”); see also Lance F. Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property
Clause: Implications for Judicial Review of National Monument Reductions, 21 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 761, 774–75 (2019) (discussing Tucker’s argument).
96
See CONOVER, supra note 88, at 18.
97
See id. at 19–20.
98
See President Andrew Jackson, U.S., Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1835)
(“At the time this institution was organized, near a quarter century ago, it would probably
have been thought extravagant to anticipate for this period such an addition to its business as
has been produced by the vast increase of those sales during the past and present years. It
may also be observed that since the year 1812 the land offices and surveying districts have
been greatly multiplied, and that numerous legislative enactments from year to year since
that time have imposed a great amount of new and additional duties upon that office, while
the want of a timely application of force commensurate with the care and labor required has
caused the increasing embarrassment of accumulated arrears in the different branches of the
establishment.”).
99
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845) (emphasis added).
100
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 175.
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the time; the Court simply reiterated the policies of the legislative and executive
branches in favor of expedient sale to speculators rather than actual management.
It was not until 1849 that any change in Congress’s approach came about, and
even then, at the height of Manifest Destiny, the focus was largely not on
stewardship. In that year, Congress established the Department of the Interior.101
Congress moved the GLO, along with all of its responsibilities, under the
supervision of this department. The Department of the Interior’s mission at its
inception, though broader in perspective than national debts and revenues, did not
yet include notions of sustainable resource management or environmental
protection. Those goals would not outwardly manifest until the twentieth century.102
As the nineteenth century came to a close, the Supreme Court once again
weighed in on the meaning of the Property Clause. During this time, the Supreme
Court’s holdings began to support a broad interpretation of the Property Clause. In
1871, in Gibson v. Chouteau, the Court for the first time described the Property
Clause power as “subject to no limitations.”103 A little more than a decade later, in
United States v. Beebee,104 the Court endorsed the notion of using the Property
Clause’s authority to protect the public domain.105 And then, at the turn of the
twentieth century, the Court issued an opinion interpreting the Property Clause that
would come to shape the doctrine for the modern era. In Camfield v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that Congress’s authority extended to the regulation of
fencing on privately-held land neighboring federal property.106 The defendants in

101

See An Act to Establish the Home Department, and to Provide for the Treasury
Department an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and a Commissioner of the Customs,
Pub. L. 30-108, 9 Stat. 395 (1849).
102
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 1014 (Jan. 26, 1909) (“It is ordered that the Pelican Island
Reservation, Florida, created by Executive Order of March 13, 1903, for the protection of
native birds, be and the same is hereby enlarged so as to include all unreserved mangrove
and other islands [near] the Tallahassee meridian, Florida . . . . It is unlawful for any person
to hunt, trap, capture, willfully disturb, or kill any bird of any kind whatever, or take the eggs
of such birds within the limits of this reservation, except under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture.”); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517 (1960).
103
80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872).
104
127 U.S. 338 (1888).
105
Id. at 342 (“[T]he Government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power
to protect the [public domain] from trespass and unlawful appropriation . . . .”).
106
167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (“Considering . . . the necessities of preventing the
enclosure of public lands, we think the fence is clearly a nuisance, and that it is within the
constitutional power of Congress to order its abatement, notwithstanding such action may
involve an entry upon the lands of a private individual.”); see also McKelvey v. United
States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922) (“[Congress] may sanction some uses and prohibit others,
and may forbid interference with such as are sanctioned.”); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S.
264, 267 (1927) (“Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that
imperil the publicly owned forests.”).
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Camfield argued that a federal statute prohibiting enclosure of public lands107 could
not be applied to their creative scheme whereby they constructed fences on the edge
of neighboring privately held parcels to effectively encapsulate a larger parcel of
public land. The Court rejected their argument, holding that Congress had “the
power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, [which] may thereby
involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the ‘police power,’108 so long as
such power is directed solely to its own protection.”109 This permissive interpretation
of the Property Clause, recognizing its underlying stewardship purpose, established
it as an important source of legislative power for the budding conservation
movement.
The twentieth century saw the Court relying on Camfield as support for a broad
notion of Property Clause authority, drawing on the case in analogous constitutional
contexts. In keeping with the holding of Camfield, rather than the dicta of Pollard,
the prevailing interpretation likened the Property Clause power to a general police
power—an interpretation oft-cited when considering the reach of police powers in
other areas.110 Specifically with respect to common resources, it was now wellsettled that the Property Clause conferred the police power necessary for “[t]he
United States [to] prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be
used.”111

107

See Camfield, 167 U.S. at 521–522; 23 Stat. 321, 43 U.S.C. § 1062 (“That all
[e]nclosures of any public lands in any State or Territory of the United States, heretofore or
to be hereafter made, erected, or constructed by any person, party, association, or
corporation, to any of which land included within the [e]nclosure the person, party,
association, or corporation making or controlling the [e]nclosure had no claim or color of
title made or acquired in good faith, or an asserted right thereto by or under claim, made in
good faith with a view to entry thereof at the proper land-office under the general laws of the
United States at the time any such [e]nclosure was or shall be made, are hereby declared to
be unlawful, and the maintenance, erection, construction, or control of any such [e]nclosure
is hereby forbidden and prohibited; and the assertion of a right to the exclusive use and
occupancy of any part of the public lands of the United States in any State or any of the
Territories of the United States, without claim, color of title, or asserted right, as above
specified as to [e]nclosure, is likewise declared unlawful, and hereby prohibited.”).
108
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 526.
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Mass., 207 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1907) (“I
hesitatingly agree with the state court that the requirement may be justified under what
commonly is called the police power. The obverse way of stating this power in the sense in
which I am using the phrase would be that constitutional rights like others are matters of
degree and that the great constitutional provisions for the protection of property are not to be
pushed to a logical extreme, but must be taken to permit the infliction of some fractional and
relatively small losses without compensation, for some at least of the purposes of wholesome
legislation.” (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524)); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104,
111 (1911) (“It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great
public needs.” (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. 518)).
111
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
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Coincident with the emerging American conservation ethos and emboldened
by the Property Clause jurisprudence, Congress enacted legislation more attuned to
protecting federal lands and resources. One emblematic statutory provision
criminalized “build[ing] a fire in or near any forest, timber, or other inflammable
material upon the public domain.”112 That particular provision became the subject
of constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court. If there was any question as
to the uniqueness of Camfield to the rather devious plot to skirt the law in that case,
the decision to uphold the aforementioned fire-prevention provision in United States
v. Alford113 made clear that the Property Clause permits regulation of private
property in a multitude of contexts. The Court explicitly held that, pursuant to the
Property Clause, “Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned
lands that imperil the publicly owned forests.”114
The more active, conservation-oriented management of public lands and
resources by executive agencies empowered by statutory delegations suggests that
the executive and legislative branches held consonant views of the federal
government’s stewardship responsibility as conferred by the Property Clause. This
activity represented the first kernels of real manifestation of the natural law
obligations undergirding the Founders’ thinking. This shift in approach did not go
unchallenged; the Court continually gave its blessing to this type of “needful”
regulation that implicated private interests, as well as public resources. One such
Department of Agriculture policy resulted in the removal to private land large
numbers of deer carcasses—the animals having been hunted within a national forest
and game preserve for the purpose of ecosystem management.115 The Supreme Court
in Hunt v. United States116 held that the policy was squarely within the power of the
United States to protect its lands and property.117 A prevailing principle emerged at
this time as to the scope of property management authority (i.e., what constitutes
proper “disposal” or a “needful” regulation). That principle required consonance

112

Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 6, 36 Stat. 855, 857, (amending § 53 of the Penal
Code of Mar. 4, 1909) (emphasis added).
113
274 U.S. 264 (1927).
114
Id. at 267 (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. at 518 and McKelvey, 260 U.S. at 353).
115
See United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 637 (1927) (reproducing the “Regulation
Permitting the Removal of Deer by Killing or Otherwise from the Grand Canyon National
Game Preserve or Parts Thereof Whenever Such Removal is Advisable in Order to Prevent
an Overstocking Detrimental to the Welfare of the Deer or to Provide Animals for Transfer
to Other Areas”).
116
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
117
Id. at 100 (“The district forester, acting under the direction of the Secretary of
Agriculture, proceeded to kill large numbers of the deer and ship the carcasses outside the
limits of the reserves. That this was necessary to protect the lands of the United States within
the reserves from serious injury is made clear by the evidence. The direction given by the
Secretary of Agriculture was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress.
And the power of the United States to thus protect its lands and property does not admit of
doubt.”).

192

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

with the nature and purpose of the property in question and advancement of a true
public interest, as opposed to private interest.118
These early twentieth-century developments in Property Clause jurisprudence
reflected the nation’s explicit embrace, for the first time, of the value of wilderness
and its vast natural resources and the importance of conserving it. More than a
shifting attitude towards the natural world, this period in our history was an
awakening to values already inherent in the principles and actions undergirding our
founding. The Property Clause is but one prominent, underexplored example.119 The
presidency of Theodore Roosevelt is often credited with bringing conservation
ethics into the American political conscientiousness. The philosophy motivating
Roosevelt was at least equally important as his actions while governing. Even the
name given to the Progressive Party during Roosevelt’s failed campaign for a third
term—“Bull Moose”—reflects a reverence and appreciation for the natural world.
Bull Moose’s conservationist ideals outperformed and outlasted its candidates,
making the conservation of natural resources a vital consideration, and aspiration,
for policy decisions for years to come.120
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY CLAUSE
Interpreting the scope of the Property Clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, and
relying on Camfield to do so,121 the Supreme Court famously held that “the power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”122 In
upholding a narrow federal legislative protection for wild horses and burros,123 the
Court, perhaps unwittingly or perhaps intentionally,124 opened the door for federal
lawmakers to use their Property Clause authority to protect the natural environment.
Surprisingly, however, Congress has yet to walk through that open door, let alone
drive an electric truck filled with climate change policy through it.
118

See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, syl. ¶ 10 (1936) (“The method of disposing
of government property under the constitutional provision (§ 3, Art. IV) must be appropriate
to the nature of the property, and be adopted in the public interest as distinguished from
private or personal ends.”).
119
The sustainability ethic enshrined in Anglo-American property law doctrine of waste
is another that has enjoyed more scholarly attention. See, e.g., Anthony L. I. Moffa, Wasting
the Planet: What a Storied Doctrine of Property Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and
Climate Change, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 459 (2012); JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF
PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 52– 53 (2010).
120
See JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 153–
87 (2015).
121
See Kleppe, 426 U.S at 540–41.
122
Id. at 539; see also United States v. City & Cty. of S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)
(“The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”).
123
Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340.
124
See Leshy, A Property Clause, supra note 5, at 1101 (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s federal lands jurisprudence is an expression of “constitutional common law” that
favors “retention of federal land in national ownership (retention), national over state and
local authority (nationalization), and environmental preservation (conservation).”).
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The decision in Kleppe made clear that Property Clause authority sweeps
broadly, reaching beyond the borders of federal property. However, the Court
explicitly left open the question of just how far beyond government property borders
the power reaches125—to the extent that those borders can and should be defined by
the traditional metes and bounds of property law. That question went unanswered at
the highest court, but circuit courts expounded on it in the wake of Kleppe. Just one
year after the Supreme Court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit bluntly and aptly
described the state of the doctrine, writing that “whether federal regulations can be
deemed ‘needful’ prescriptions ‘respecting’ the public lands . . . is primarily
entrusted to the judgment of Congress, and courts exercising judicial review have
supported an expansive reading of the Property Clause.”126 The court relied on this
deferential reading to uphold congressional regulation of non-federal waters.127 The
Ninth Circuit similarly unequivocally declared as “well-established” the
understanding that the Property Clause “grants to the United States power to regulate
conduct on non-federal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal
property.”128 This interpretation of the Property Clause was understood as a
necessary incident of Congress’s undisputed power to dedicate federal land for
specific purposes (e.g., the protection of wildlife); Congress must have the ability to
make unlawful conduct that threatens those chosen purposes.129 The Supreme Court
has suggested, relying on Kleppe and Camfield, that a purpose-driven understanding
of the authority of the Property Clause’s reach comports with the Constitution.130
The Eighth Circuit has most clearly laid out, and repeatedly reaffirmed, this
contemporary understanding of the Property Clause:
Under this [Property Clause-based] authority to protect public land,
Congress’ power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public
land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands. Congress
125

See Kleppe, 426 U.S at 546 (“While it is clear that regulations under the Property
Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate in this declaratory
judgment proceeding to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers
Congress to protect animals on private lands or the extent to which such regulation is
attempted by the Act.”).
126
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing City & Cty. of
S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 28– 30 (1940)).
127
Brown, 552 F.2d at 821– 22 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Property Clause
authorizes Congress “to regulate activities on non-federal public waters in order to protect
wildlife and visitors on [federal] lands”).
128
United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
129
See Minn. ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981).
130
See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 319 (1983) (“The United States is
authorized to incorporate into easement agreements such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of the Interior deems necessary for the protection of wildlife, 16 U. S. C. § 715e,
and these rules and regulations may include restrictions on land outside the legal description
of the easement.” (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) and Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-526 (1897)).
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clearly has the power to dedicate federal land for particular purposes. As
a necessary incident of that power, Congress must have the ability to insure
that these lands be protected against interference with their intended
purposes.131
That reading of the Clause attributes appropriate precedential weight to both
Camfield and Kleppe, while adding a layer of reasoning with respect to the Property
Clause’s reach that comports with common sense and the Founders’ natural law
perspectives on stewardship of common resources. It would be nonsensical if
Congress were powerless to protect federal resources from depletion at the hands of
any source not emanating from federal property itself.
Congress’s seeming reluctance to rely on the Property Clause cannot be
attributed to inconsistent signals from the Court132 or to lack of opportunity. The
latter half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century have forced
society to confront some of the greatest environmental threats in human history—
threats that unquestionably touched federal lands. Since before that time, and
continuing through it, the Supreme Court’s federal lands jurisprudence could be read
to endorse three approaches: retention, nationalization, and conservation.133 That
trifecta translates to a green light for legislation that maintains or expands federal
landholdings, while protecting them from environmental degradation.
This modern, more expansive interpretation of the Property Clause, while
questioned by some scholars,134 has held fast in the courts in recent decades as well.
Indeed, in recent years even reticent federal courts have avoided finding any
limitation within the constitutional doctrine itself, assuming sweeping Property
Clause authority and instead relying on principles of statutory interpretation to read
the particular statutes at issue to confine federal agency action.135 Affirmative
131

United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1062 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Minn. ex
rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981)).
132
There does exist some limited authority that scholars and commentators could draw
on to suggest that Camfield was a unique, non-precedential situation and that Kleppe was
perhaps wrongly decided, or at least wrongly interpreted in subsequent years. In particular,
the Court considered the application of the very same statute from Camfield to an agricultural
corporation’s refusal to permit a public road through its property. In Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court characterized Camfield as “analyz[ing] the fence [on private land
that practically enclosed federal land] from the perspective of nuisance law, and
conclude[ing] that the Unlawful Inclosures Act was an appropriate exercise of the police
power.” 440 U.S. 668, 685 (1979). The Leo Sheep Court went on to explain in dicta that
Camfield “affirmed the grantee’s right to fence completely his own land.” Id.
133
Leshy, A Property Clause, supra note 5, at 1101.
134
See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 6; Allison H. Eid, The Property Clause and New
Federalism, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1241 (2004).
135
See, e.g., Utah Native Plant Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 923 F.3d 860, 867 (10th Cir.
2019) (“Assuming the Property Clause reaches thus far, Congress, with the aim of preserving
federal lands, might rely on it to enact legislation altering the State of Utah’s authority to
manage wildlife on its own lands. . . . While Congress might enact legislation respecting
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statements of the Property Clause’s broad reach have also been a hallmark of some
recent decisions. The Ninth Circuit described as regulable activity “that has
implications for [federal] land even if commenced on property adjacent to [it].”136
In a case upholding the priority given to rural Alaskans for subsistence hunting
permits, the court specifically identified the goals of congressional policy as
conservation of limited natural resources and protection of wildlife-dependent rural
inhabitants.137 Taken together, these cases suggest that Congress can act under the
Property Clause to protect natural resources, as well as human and environmental
health more broadly, and can target harmful activities on private land with that
action.
V. LIMITING THE LIMITLESS
Given the interconnected nature of the planetary ecosystem, the increasing
industrialization and globalization of human society, and the ability of modern
science to detect even the slightest of environmental impacts, the scope of the
Property Clause power under current doctrine could truly be unlimited.138 Some, no
doubt, do not fear such a state of affairs; indeed, many environmentalists would
celebrate constitutional law’s harmonization with the true practical reach of human
development on the natural world. Surprisingly, you could also count the 1940
Supreme Court among the unconcerned. That year, the Court presciently spoke of
the possibility of an unconstrained authority related to federal lands and did not
express concern about its self-professed inability to constrain Congress’s legislative
authority in this area. The 1940 Court in United States v. City and County of San
Francisco wrote that Congress, not the courts, had the responsibility of determining
the limits of its own authority, presumably by exercising a similar restraint to that of
the Court when tasked with defining judicial review.139
national forests, the ‘clear and manifest purpose’ of which is to preempt Utah’s traditional
trustee and police powers as a sovereign to manage wildlife within its borders, it has not done
so.”); Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 865 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The Forest Service tells
us that it can regulate littoral and riparian rights under the Property Clause to the same extent
that state regulators can regulate them. Maybe; maybe not. But we need not decide.”);
Virginia v. Reno, 955 F. Supp. 571, 580 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that the Enclave Clause of
Article I does not limit Congress’s authority under the Property Clause of Article IV).
136
United States v. Parker, 761 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
137
Alaska Const. Legal Def. Conservation Fund, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 198 F. App’x
601, 603 (9th Cir. 2006).
138
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 190 (“Because natural ecosystems are highly
interconnected, virtually any land use or activity that causes pollution could substantially
affect federal land.”). This is not to suggest that no extrinsic limits to the clause would exist
regardless of how its text is interpreted. See Appel, supra note 7, at 103 (“The exercise of
the Property Clause power would not excuse Congress from otherwise applicable
requirements, such as the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”).
139
See United States v. City & Cty. of S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 29–30 (1940) (“The power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. And it is not for the
courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.”).
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A great many others (including the majority of legal scholars and
policymakers), however, would resist a Property Clause doctrine that in effect vested
Congress with unconstrained federal police power.140 The Framers famously and
quite clearly opposed such a system of government.141 Thus, a thin thread of
scholarship has developed in an attempt to decipher some limitation on the Property
Clause power from history, text, and jurisprudence. To date, these efforts have failed
to produce an acceptable theory that simultaneously respects: the stewardship ethos
ingrained within the Clause,142 the existing doctrine from Camfield to Kleppe, the
harsh reality of human impacts on the environment, and the practical workings of
Congress and the courts. After an explanation of why some prominent proposed
limitations fail to adhere to these goals, this piece will offer a simple, elegant
solution for those concerned about leaving the Property Clause power open-ended.
The text of the Property Clause itself provides four potential hooks on which to
hang a limiting principle. Again, the relevant part of the Clause reads: “[t]he
Congress shall have Power to . . . make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”143 The italicized
words are the aforementioned hooks. As Peter Appel explained, these words
describe the necessary attributes of an exercise of Property Clause authority: “First,
the enactment must be a rule or regulation. Second, the rule or regulation must
involve property belonging to the United States. Third, the rule or regulation must
be needful. Fourth, and finally . . . the rule or regulation must be one ‘respecting’
federal property.”144
Assuming that Congress understands how to write a legislative rule or
regulation and knows the extent of the relevant federal property, the best textual
candidates for limiting principles are the words “needful” and “respecting.”
“Needful” could be interpreted to impose some substantive limitation, while
“respecting” could be interpreted as the source of some geographic limitation.
Together, they are best understood as indicating that there must be a nexus between
the rule or regulation, the federal property, and the purpose of that property.145 The
140

See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 190 (“A sufficiently broad interpretation of the Property
Clause, however, would essentially create an unlimited federal police power.”).
141
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with
which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected. The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.”).
142
See supra Part II.
143
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
144
Appel, supra note 7, at 79–80 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
145
See id. at 83 (“The most serious limitation intrinsic to the Property Clause questions
whether the act qualifies as a rule or regulation ‘respecting’ the property of the United States.
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difficult question—the one the proposed limiting principles purport to answer—asks
what precise type and degree of nexus is constitutionally sufficient.
At the furthest end of the spectrum towards a very limited scope of Property
Clause authority lies the infamous Dred Scott opinion.146 Along the way to the
universally denounced majority holding in the case, Justice Taney asserted a
likewise wrongheaded and extraordinarily narrow interpretation of the Property
Clause. In his view, the Clause “applied only to the property which the States held
in common at [the Founding], and ha[d] no reference whatever to any territory or
other property which the new sovereignty might afterwards itself acquire.”147
Modern scholars have largely rejected this interpretation,148 and not just due to the
unsavory opinion from which it derives. Those who urge a narrow interpretation see
no rationale for excluding federal property acquired after the Founding from
Congress’s reach, choosing to focus on the substantive, rather than geographic,
scope of authority. The most popular limitation in this vein argues that Congress has
no more power over federal property than an ordinary private landowner.149 Thus, at
least when acting solely pursuant to the Property Clause, Congress would be limited
by state law in what it could permit or prohibit.150 This theory, while simple to apply,
fails on the other relevant dimensions. It contradicts years of Supreme Court
precedent concerning not only the Property Clause but the application of other state
and local law to the federal government as landowner more generally.151 Much of
the Property Clause jurisprudence discussed herein involved the Court giving
This requirement means that the federal government must demonstrate a nexus between the
rule or regulation and the federal property being protected.”).
146
See generally Dred Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
147
Id. at 436.
148
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 179 (“Like most modern scholars, this Article does not
endorse Dred Scott’s narrow interpretation of the scope of the land governed by the Property
Clause.”).
149
See, e.g., id. at 148 (“In sum, this Article will argue that, while Congress should
have a police power over the federal territories, it should have no more regulatory authority
over federal land within a state by virtue of the Property Clause than a private landowner.
Under this approach, Congress could continue to limit activities on federal lands, just as any
landowner can exclude trespassers. When acting solely under the Property Clause, however,
Congress would not have the ability to preempt otherwise valid state regulations.”); see also
Louis Touton, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821 (1980) (“It has long been established that, at a minimum, the
property clause gives the federal government the same powers over federally owned land as
a private landowner has over his private land.” (emphasis added) (citing Alabama v. Texas,
347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474–75 (1915))).
150
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 148 (advocating this limit and nevertheless
acknowledging that Congress could, of course, pass legislation pursuant to other enumerated
powers that superseded otherwise applicable state law).
151
See, e.g., Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) (holding that property of
the United States government is exempt from taxation under the authority of a state);
Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. Price Cnty., 133 U.S. 496 (1890) (reaffirming holding in Van
Brocklin).
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constitutional sanction to legislative restrictions that a private landowner could never
impose.152 Furthermore, limiting the Property Clause to essentially a truism—the
government as lawful property owner can exercise its property rights—strips the
conferred power of any underlying philosophical connection to the concept of
stewardship of common resources. As environmental science makes clear, the ability
to preserve and protect natural resources requires more than ordinary property rights
over them. Myriad actions and forces beyond the borders of federal lands have the
capacity to degrade and destroy them. Camfield and Kleppe properly recognized that
reality. To narrow the Property Clause authority, especially as the Commerce Clause
potentially grows out of fashion,153 would perilously defang the legislature in its
ability to protect our natural resources from the catastrophic effects of climate
change. When proposing to reinterpret the Constitution to limit Congress’s
authority, such practical consequences are relevant to the analysis,154 and in this
case, counsel strongly against an overly restrictive limiting principle based on
notions of private property rights.
Another prominent line of limiting theory similarly draws on traditional notions
of property law, while also acknowledging that the federal government’s reach
extends beyond the borders of its landholdings. A nuisance-based limiting principle,
alternatively articulated by Joseph Sax155 and Eugene Gaetke,156 would allow
Congress to engage in extraterritorial regulation pursuant to the Property Clause if
that regulation met a balancing test. Drawing on the common law of nuisance is
attractive because it speaks to the ability to control, or at least seek compensation
for, activities that interfere with the use and enjoyment of property but do not occur
within the metes and bounds of the property itself. Nuisance is in many ways the
152
See supra Parts IV and V; see also Touton, supra note 149, at 821 (“[T]he property
clause itself accords the federal government certain rights unavailable to private landowners.
Thus, Congress has power to dispose of its property irrespective of state-created restrictions,
and it may extract revenue by leasing or selling its land, or by selling products of the land. . . .
[T]he courts have upheld federal laws designed to protect federal lands by prohibiting fires
on neighboring property, securing access to federal lands, or exterminating state-protected
deer to prevent overbrowsing.” (citing Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872); United
States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537–38 (1840); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330–40 (1936); United States v. Alford,
274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524–26 (1897); Hunt v.
United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928)).
153
See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 150 (“[T]he importance of the Property Clause will
grow if, and when, the Court narrows the reach of the federal commerce power.”).
154
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 601 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“Consistent with the Framers’ intent, we have repeatedly emphasized that
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is dependent upon ‘practical’
considerations, including ‘actual experience.’” (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin SteelCorp.,
301 U. S. 1, 41–42)); see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 122 (1942); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 573 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155
See Sax, supra note 4, at 250–55.
156
See Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property Clause, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 381, 395–402 (1981).
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common law predecessor of modern environmental law, providing a framework for
determining when specific noxious uses so harmed specific environments that they
warranted injunctive relief. If one conceives of federal property as a conglomeration
of specifically endangered parcels, this analogy works quite well and allows courts
to draw on a wealth of common law precedent.157 Eugene Gaetke proposed a
Property Clause formulation of the nuisance analysis thusly:
[T]he value of the challenged regulation to the public lands should be
compared to the degree of imposition on the owners of nonfederal
property. Should the balance indicate that the regulation interferes with the
ownership of nonfederal property more than is warranted by Congress’s
stated policy, a court justifiably could conclude that it is not a ‘needful’
regulation ‘respecting the federal lands.’158
The limiting principle derived from nuisance law would thus amount to a costbenefit analysis, rendering unconstitutional any Property Clause-based restriction
that imposed a cost on a private landowner greater than the benefit provided to
federal property.
At first blush, the nuisance approach seems elegantly conceived and arguably
consistent with the text of the Property Clause. However, when one considers the
different nature of federal property from personal property, the flaws in relying on
nuisance law to interpret the Constitution are exposed. Federal property is a diffuse,
diverse, and collectively massive common resource; many different activities
threaten it in many different ways. Indeed, individual private landowners impose
cumulative negative environmental effects on federal property almost continuously
across time and space. It would thus be very difficult in practice to apply Gaetke’s
proposed balancing test to individual acts of Congress in isolation, let alone the
working of those acts to individual private tracts. Courts would be forced to make
decisions about when and what could be considered together (i.e., aggregated); in a
best-case scenario, a doctrine would develop around such determinations. At worst,
they would be made on an ad-hoc basis. Either way, nuisance law, necessarily
concerned with individual property owners and specific parcels, would provide little

157
See Sax, supra note 4, at 254 n.77 (1976) (“Another self-limiting rationale for the
use of the property clause to regulate peripheral private uses could be drawn from an analogy
to the Court’s evolution of a federal common law of nuisance in cases involving interstate
pollution.” (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907))).
158
Gaetke, supra note 156, at 398.
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guidance. Furthermore, stewardship of common resources and prevention of
environmental harm operate on multi-generational timescales,159 implicating
questions about discounting in the context of the type of cost-benefit analysis
commonly employed in nuisance situations.160
A more jurisprudentially practical approach to deciphering a Property Clause
limiting principle looks not to other sources of property law but to the interpretation
of other clauses of the Constitution. Peter Appel championed this approach as
derived from Akhil Amar’s intratextual theory161 of constitutional interpretation.162
Appel’s interpretive insight was to not just draw on similar words and phrases in
other constitutional clauses, but similar purposes and functions.163 Using this
technique, the Commerce Clause emerges as the most salient analogous
constitutional provision—it confers upon Congress authority to “regulate” in a
broadly conceived topical area. Not only that, but abuse, or even merely expansion,
of Commerce and Property Clause authority implicate similar concerns.164 Modern
Commerce Clause doctrine limits the reach of Congress’s authority to regulating
only “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”165 Appel has
proposed a nearly identical Property Clause limit, based on the word “respecting”—
Congress can regulate only those activities substantially affecting federal lands.166
That interpretation fits the text well and has the advantage of a wealth of analogous
constitutional precedent to draw on. Perhaps the most contentious strain of that
Commerce Clause precedent concerns what types of activities can be aggregated to
determine whether their effect is substantial. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court made
clear that only the effects of “economic” activities can be aggregated to justify
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. Where Appel’s theory of the
159
See PURDY, supra note 120, at 139 (2010) (describing how the longer time horizon
of climate change makes cost-benefit analysis politically useless, noting that “within any
political cycle, it is highly likely that the costs of a serious mitigation effort will outweigh its
benefits”).
160
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010).
161
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999)
(describing “intratextualism” as the interpretive technique wherein “the interpreter tries to
read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage
in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase”).
162
See Appel, supra note 7, at 91 n.412 (“The approach I suggest is similar but not
identical to Amar’s theory of intratextualism. Amar argued that in interpreting one word or
phrase in the Constitution, courts should look at similar terms and words in the text and how
they have been interpreted.”).
163
See id. (“My approach to the Property Clause, by contrast, looks at possibly
analogous clauses that may provide guidance in finding the reach of the Property Clause.”).
164
See id. (“The clause that best suggests itself for this purpose is the Commerce Clause,
because it implicates many of the same concerns as extra-territorial uses of the Property
Clause.”).
165
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000)).
166
See Appel, supra note 7, at 83, 101.
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Property Clause falls short—just before the finish line—is in deriving an appropriate
analogous limitation on activities that affect federal property.167
Picking up the intratextualist spade in pursuit of a limiting principle, one simply
need look afresh at the Commerce Clause aggregation parameters in Lopez and
Morrison. The Court there focused on “economic” activities, a characterization that
closely tracked the constitutional text’s reference to “commerce.”168 Importantly,
when determining whether to aggregate effects, the word “interstate” drops away—
each individual activity need not be interstate, but need be economic. Similarly, the
text of the Property Clause includes language describing the type of activity that is
theoretically relevant for aggregation—the words “territory” and “other property.”
A relatively conservative intertextual approach suggests that these words at least
encompass all activity concerning “land.” In other words, economic is to commerce,
as land is to territory or property. An intertextual approach that attributes distinct
meaning to both territory and property would counsel for an aggregation principle
that accounts for all activity concerning land and tangible personal property. This
limit would be used to determine the reach of Congress’s authority to regulate
activity on private property under the Property Clause.169 Thus understood,
aggregation of activities on private property would be permissible to demonstrate a
substantial effect on federal property if those activities were land-concerning
activities, i.e., activities controlled by land use regulation, including zoning; or
activities involving the use of tangible personal property, i.e., operation of
machinery. So, for example, operation of an industrial facility could be aggregated,
but purchasing a stock or banking online could not. It is certainly true that a great
many activities fall into this category, and thus the Property Clause provides the
equivalent of police powers over wide swaths of our lives. That reading is entirely
consistent with the stewardship purpose of the Property Clause and the reality of
environmental harms in the modern age.
How the law defines “the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States” will also play a role in determining the scope of the Property Clause
authority—it determines where one looks for a significant effect. Under a broad
conception, rooted in natural law principles, all common resources could
167
Compare Appel, supra note 7, at 96 (“Simply asserting that the aggregation principle
should apply to extraterritorial regulations enacted under the Property Clause does not clearly
identify which activities Congress can aggregate to show a substantial effect on federal
lands.”), with id. at 101 (“Under the Commerce Clause, courts limit intrastate federal
regulation to those activities of an economic nature. Analogously, under the Property Clause,
courts should permit federal regulation of extraterritorial activities only when substantially
related to federal property.”).
168
See Morrison, 529 U.S at 610 (2000) (describing the law invalidated in Lopez as
“ha[ving] nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995)).
169
The Property Clause authority need not rely on aggregation and is unquestionably a
police power when Congress is regulating entirely within the boundaries of federal land. See
Frank & Eckhard, supra note 6, at 673–74.
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theoretically be included. Thus, individual activities conducted with personal or real
property would be subject to regulation if, when considered together, they had a
significant effect on air, water, or other natural resources. That view would
undoubtedly leave room for myriad environmental laws rooted in the Property
Clause. A narrower conception, including only what the federal government had
legal title to within the category of concern, would still permit a great deal of
environmental Property Clause legislation. Most importantly, as outlined below, a
requirement of significant effect on even just federal landholdings would provide
the authority for important climate change legislation.
A Property Clause limiting principle that mirrors Commerce Clause doctrine
makes sense from a judicial administration and resource preservation standpoint.
With respect to judicial administration, despite some misgivings of the Lopez and
Morrison dissenters,170 the Commerce Clause distinction between economic and
noneconomic activities has been applied faithfully and consistently by the federal
courts. The distinction between those activities that touch and concern the land (or
personal property), and those that do not, is a much less amorphous and much more
well-established distinction.171 One would expect the Courts, and Congress, to
understand and apply it quite well. From an environmental and conservation
standpoint, there would be few polluting activities that would fall outside the reach
of the properly understood Property Clause authority. As outlined in the following
section, Congress can, and should, cite the Clause as constitutional authority for
regulating emissions of greenhouse gases.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
Putting together the fundamental acknowledgment of some stewardship
obligation running with the Property Clause at its inception with the modern
conception of a power dubbed unlimited by the twentieth-century Supreme Court,
there exists the requisite authority to legislatively address the climate crisis. Even
constrained by the limitation proposed in the previous part, the power vested in
Congress by the Clause includes wide latitude to address both the causes (e.g.,
emissions from stationary sources) and the harms (e.g., sea-level rise) of climate
change. Despite the existing permissive doctrine and previous discussion of the
Property Clause as an alternate basis for environmental legislation, there has, prior
to this work, been no serious Property Clause climate policy proposal and analysis
thereof.
The most prominent Property Clause scholarship to date, however, did quite
thoroughly analyze the authority to regulate conventional air pollution pursuant to
the Clause. Peter Appel convincingly laid out the sound constitutional basis for a
hypothetical “National Parks Clean Air Act,” which would directly regulate sources
170

See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Consider the problems.
The ‘economic/noneconomic’ distinction is not easy to apply.”).
171
U.S. v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (rejecting the argument that the word “near” was
too indefinite a limitation on the reach of a statute regulating activity on private property).
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of sulfur and nitrous oxides.172 His imagined act would regulate activities far from
federal land, relying on the conclusion that they, “in the aggregate, harm federal
lands in a demonstrable way.”173 He correctly characterized such legislation as
posing two difficult questions for Property Clause doctrine; first, “whether Congress
could regulate stationary sources of air pollution located several states away if it
could reasonably conclude that these sources damaged federal property”; and
second, “whether Congress could directly regulate all sources of sulfur dioxide or
nitric oxides across the country because they collectively contribute to a problem
that affects federal property.”174 Applying the Commerce Clause analogy discussed
in the prior section, Appel argued that the doctrine answered both questions in the
affirmative.175 Adding the aggregation analysis proposed herein would not
materially change that outcome. Assuming the vast majority of sources of air
pollution involve activities that inherently concern land, their effects could be
aggregated to demonstrate a substantial negative effect on air quality in National
Parks, thereby constitutionally justifying air pollution regulation pursuant to the
Property Clause. This logic quite comfortably extends to controlling greenhouse gas
emissions.
Even if we constrain the permissible purpose of Property Clause-based
legislation to the protection of legally recognized property interests held by the
federal government, the authority for comprehensive climate legislation exists. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court accepted that the impacts of climate
change affect the value of government landholdings (in that case state government)
negatively.176 And in Kleppe, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the Property
Clause authority sweeps broadly enough to permit regulation on private land for the
purpose of protecting public land.177 Thus, combining those holdings, permissible
Property Clause regulation would include the curtailment of greenhouse gas
emissions from private land for the purpose of protecting federal landholdings by
way of climate mitigation.
172

See Appel, supra note 7, at 84, 97 (describing the National Park Clean Air Act’s
reach as “exceed[ing] the level of regulation that the common law of nuisance would
produce” and “extend[ing] to all sources of these air pollutants from large factories to
automobiles and trucks”).
173
Id. at 84.
174
See Appel, supra note 7, at 97.
175
Id.
176
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (“Because the Commonwealth
‘owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,’ it has alleged a particularized
injury in its capacity as a landowner.” (citations omitted)); see also Rhode Island v. Shell Oil
Prods. Co., 979 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Rhode Island is salty about losing its already
limited square footage to rising sea levels caused by climate change.”), vacated, 210 L. Ed.
2d 830 (2021).
177
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 538 (“[T]he Property Clause is broad enough to permit federal
regulation of fences built on private land adjoining public land when the regulation is for the
protection of the federal property . . . the power granted by the Property Clause is broad
enough to reach beyond territorial limits.”) (citing Camfield, 167 U. S. at 518).
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The federal government currently owns approximately 640 million acres,
comprising 28% of the 2.27 billion acres of the United States’ total land area.178 Of
those total landholdings, almost 80 million acres fall under the purview of the
National Park Service.179 A federal research group found in 2008 that “[c]limate
change is redefining [national] parks and will continue to do so.”180 The report went
on to identify habitat loss as an effect of climate change that demanded attention.181
If the Property Clause permits Congress to protect living resources themselves for
their own sake (in addition to the terrestrial ecosystem they inhabit),182 ample
scientific research demonstrates the negative effects of climate change on myriad
species.183
The Park Service has also since put forward strategies to deal specifically with
the impacts of sea-level rise on management areas, which include, among other
things, “accelerated coastal erosion [and] landward migration of shorelines.”184 A
study of country vulnerability to sea-level rise ranked the United States among the
ten nations most exposed, based on land area within the floodplain of predicted
scenarios.185 According to that model’s accounting, more than 20,000 square
kilometers will be newly susceptible to flooding by 2100.186 A complete accounting
of precisely how much of that coastal property belongs to the federal government is
beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, maps constructed with GIS data from
the National Atlas reveal significant coastal property in Florida, California, Oregon,
Washington, and Alaska under BLM and NPS management.187 A finer toothed comb
of GIS data would surely reveal many smaller parcels as well. The fact that climate
178

CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 62, at 2; see also Appel, supra note 7, at 1 (“The
United States owns land in every state, approximately thirty percent of all of the land in the
United States, and approximately eighty percent of the land in the state of Nevada.”).
179
See id.
180
JILL S. BARON, CRAIG D. ALLEN, JESSICA FLESIHMAN, LANCE GUNDERSON, DON
MCKENZIE, LAURA MEYERSON, JILL OROPEZA & NATE STEPHESON, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCI. PROGRAM, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE
ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 4-3 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008)
(emphasis omitted).
181
Id. at 5–19.
182
See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 537 (“[I]t is far from clear that . . . Congress cannot assert a
property interest in the regulated [animals] superior to that of the State.”).
183
See, e.g., WILDLIFE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: NORTH AMERICAN CASE
STUDIES (Stephen H. Schneider & Terry L. Root eds., 2002); Catherine E. Burns, Kevin M.
Johnston & Oswald T. Schmitz, Global Climate Change and Mammalian Species Diversity
in U.S. National Parks, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 20 (2003).
184
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, COASTAL ADAPTATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 3
(Rebecca Beavers, Amanda Babson & Courtney Schupp, eds., 2016).
185
See S. Brown, R.J. Nicholls, P. Goodwin, I.D. Haigh, D. Lincke, A.T. Vafeidis & J.
Hinkel, Quantifying Land and People Exposed to Sea‐Level Rise with No Mitigation and
1.5°C and 2.0°C Rise in Global Temperatures to Year 2300, EARTH’S FUTURE 583, 593
(2018).
186
See id. at 594.
187
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 62, at 12–14.
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change will escalate the loss of some measurable portion of this property is
undeniable. Accordingly, Congress can, and should, use its Property Clause
authority to protect these federal lands.
But could such a climate bill have the reach necessary to be effective? In other
words, could it target the sources of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as buffer the
effects of climate change on common resources? President Biden seems to think
such an effort would at least have symbolic value; his recent flurry of executive
orders on the climate crisis made specific reference to the federal government using
property management authority to “combat the climate crisis by example. . . .”188
Symbolism and leadership aside, certainly, if one interprets the reach of Property
Clause authority as limited only by the question of what property-related activity
causes substantial effects on federal property,189 all sources of emissions would be
the fair subject of such legislation. A bill targeting greenhouse gases would not
materially differ from Peter Appel’s hypothetical National Parks Clean Air Act,
which he convincingly greenlighted using that framework.190 The more difficult
question is: could a bill limited by the aggregation principle offered above control a
significant amount of greenhouse gas emissions? The most recent data suggests that
it could. According to the EPA’s inventory of greenhouse gas emissions over the
past two decades, activities related to energy account for more than 80% of total
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.191 The vast majority of energy-related
emissions come from the combustion of fossil fuels. Indeed, “the direct combustion
of fuels by stationary sources in the electric power, industrial, commercial, and
residential sectors represent the greatest share of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”192
Those activities are by definition related to the use of land, and their effects on the
climate would thus be subject to aggregation under any reading of the limiting
principle suggested in the prior part. In other words, needful regulation pursuant to
the Property Clause could lawfully control these sources for the purposes of
protecting federal resources. Unsurprisingly, transportation emissions make up the
next largest share. Most of those sources would be controllable as well, albeit
through more creative means, such as regulations pertaining to manufacturing and
the use of the federal highway system.
None of the climate change bills put forward in Congress or regulations
proposed by EPA have proffered the Property Clause as their primary source of
constitutional authority. The earliest proposed serious climate change laws—the
Climate Stewardship Acts (also called the “McCain-Lieberman Bills”) of the early
2000s and the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also called the
“Waxman-Markey Bill”)—were quite explicitly designed as economic regulation.

188

Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7623 (Jan. 27, 2021).
See, e.g., Appel, supra note 7, at 97–98.
190
See id. at 80–81.
191
See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2018,
at 3-1 (2020).
192
Id. at 3–14.
189
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Because these bills came about prior to 2011,193 no statement of constitutional
authority accompanied their debate on the floor of the House or the Senate.
However, all indications point to no serious consideration of the Property Clause, or
the conservation of common resources, as the constitutional foundation of the
proposed climate law. The popular and scholarly analysis of these bills, and the capand-trade policy they embodied, focused on their economic impacts.194
Following years of failure in the legislative branch to pass comprehensive
climate legislation, the executive branch now appears to be the main driver behind
climate policy.195 The EPA set out to use existing delegated authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate carbon pollution through a series of prominent rules.
Perhaps the most ambitious of these rules—the so-called “Clean Power Plan”—
sought to limit carbon emissions from existing stationary sources in the electric
utility sector.196 In promulgating the rule, the EPA addressed its constitutionality and
any challenges thereto. That discussion included no mention of the affirmative
constitutional authority for a Clean Air Act rule addressing climate change; it instead
focused on swatting away negative Tenth Amendment commandeering
arguments.197 Scott Pruitt, serving then as the Attorney General of Oklahoma, voiced
the constitutional objections to a committee of the House of Representatives,
claiming that the rule did not “provide States with the meaningful opportunity to

193

See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 17 (In 2011, the House of
Representatives passed Rule XII, clause 7(c), requiring so-called “Constitutional Authority
Statements” accompany proposed legislation.).
194
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 311 (2003). (“The global warming problem is fraught with
uncertainty concerning the degree of its severity and the amount of economic sacrifice
needed today to stave off future disaster.”); Myron Ebell, Trojan Hearse, N. Y. POST (June
25, 2009, 6:29 AM) https://nypost.com/2009/06/25/trojan-hearse/ [https://perma.cc/3AWR898Q] (“[T]he Waxman-Markey bill (as it’s commonly called, after its two chief sponsors)
would be the largest tax increase in world history, as well as transfer vast wealth from
consumers to big-business special interests.”).
195
Robert Brinkmann & Sandra Jo Garren, Synthesis of Climate Change Policy in
Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Branches of U.S. Government, SCH. OF GEOSCI. FAC.
AND STAFF PUBL’NS 971 (2011) (noting that suits against GHG emitters in courts, executive
orders by U.S. presidents, and agency actions on climate change have increased as little
legislation targeting climate change has passed Congress).
196
See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
197
See id. at 64881–82 (“Some commenters have raised concerns that the emission
guidelines and requirements for 111(d) state plans violate principles of federalism embodied
in the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Tenth Amendment. These commenters claim that
states will be unconstitutionally ‘coerced’ or ‘commandeered’ into taking certain actions in
order to avoid the prospect of either a federal 111(d) plan applying to sources in the state, or
of losing federal funds. We disagree on both fronts.”).
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decline implementation.”198 One of President Trump’s early executive orders
similarly suggested that the Clean Power Plan violated constitutionally enshrined
principles of federalism.199 Notably absent from these constitutional arguments
against greenhouse gas emissions regulation is any question as to Congress’s
affirmative source of authority to address air pollution. This absence suggests an
implicit acceptance of earlier proffered200 Commerce Clause justifications for the
Clean Air Act.
The recently revived legislative efforts to address climate change represent the
most ambitious attempt yet in terms of its reach and scope. These newly proposed
bills are accompanied by statements of constitutional authority. Unsurprisingly,
none cite Article IV, Section 3, instead preferring to make explicit the reliance on
the Commerce Clause of Article I. The constitutional authority statements for both
the Climate Stewardship Act of 2019 and the Green New Deal state simply,
“Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant to the following: Article
I, Section 8.”201 The analysis herein suggests that these statements at best reflect an
incomplete acknowledgment of the source of Congress’s authority, and at worst,
reflect an intentional and dangerous decision to legally bind climate policy to
economic policy. The final part below describes why additional reliance on the
Property Clause would carve a better, cleaner, stronger path forward for the federal
government’s efforts to combat the climate crisis.
VII. WHY THE SOURCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY MATTERS
Any sound interpretation of current doctrine reveals that the Commerce Clause
provides ample authority for Congress to legislatively address the climate crisis
through a number of avenues—capping emissions, subsidizing clean energy,
funding infrastructure and energy grid improvements. So, why concern ourselves
with the question of whether the Property Clause would also justify such legislative
action? Let me offer three reasons.
Firstly, and most importantly, the proffered constitutional basis for legislation
says something about the underlying fundamental purpose of the law and affects
consequential choices about statutory language. As Cass Sunstein powerfully argued
almost three decades ago, law serves an expressive, in addition to behavior-policing,
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Impact of EPA’s Clean Power Plan on States: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Env’t, H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 114th Cong. 14–22 (2016) (Testimony of Hon.
Scott Pruitt, AG of Oklahoma).
199
See Exec. Order 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,
82 Fed. Reg. 16093, 16095 (Mar. 28, 2017) (directing federal agencies to review the existing
Clean Power Plan, and “if appropriate . . . suspend, revise, or rescind . . . those rules.”).
200
See supra Part I.
201
Climate Stewardship Act of 2019, H.R. 4269, 116th Cong. (2019); 165 Cong. Rec.
H8720–21 (October 31, 2019); Green New Deal for Public Housing Act H.R. 5185, 116th
Cong. (2019); 165 Cong. Rec. H9058 (November 19, 2019).
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function.202 Sunstein spotlights environmental law as a discipline where the social
meaning of regulation is an important part of the policy debate.203 One might
understand important air and water pollution controls as both efforts to physically
protect those natural resources and statements about society’s collective attitude
towards them. The preamble sections of some statutes testify to Congress’s explicit
recognition of this important expression.204
As detailed above,205 for years, environmental statutes have been justified as
regulation of commerce—in other words, economic policy. That link has been more
than just a legal argument used to defend environmental law from constitutional
attacks. The policy debate has been dominated by conversations about tradeoffs,
quantification of costs and benefits, and, more recently, jobs in regulated industries.
The dominance of the economic framing has in turn subordinated other perspectives
at the core of environmentalism—ecology, ethics, and equity, to name a few. The
language of environmental law largely reflects that subordination. Statutes explicitly
mention “costs” and “economics,”206 while forgoing philosophical or moral
imperatives. At least one prominent reason for that drafting style is the stated
202

See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022, 2024 (1996) (“Many people support law because of the statements made by law, and
disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law.”).
203
Id. at 2024 (“In environmental protection, public debate is often focused on the
perceived social meaning of law.”); see also id. (offering the Endangered Species Act,
emissions trading, and mandatory recycling as examples of environmental policies that serve
important expressive functions); see generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning
of Environmental Command and Control, 20 VA. ENV’T. L. J. 191, 193 (2001) (identifying
“two principle social meanings that appear to have been conveyed by the command and
control system and explor[ing] the implications of the second social meaning for the future
of environmental law.”).
204
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (“The Congress,
recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of
the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, highdensity urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding
technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares
that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local
governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”).
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See supra Part I.
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See, e.g., Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (“The term
‘best available control technology’ means an emission limitation based on the maximum
degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act emitted from or
which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-bycase basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs,
determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and
available methods, systems, and techniques . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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constitutional basis in the Commerce Clause. The intractable environmental policy
problem of climate change calls for a wider spectrum of perspectives from which to
draw solutions.207 At least in the United States, how a policy problem is framed
within our Constitutional system of government constrains the range of options
government will consider. Full consideration and debate of economic and
noneconomic theories of environmental protection thus require acknowledging both
the Commerce and Property Clauses as legitimate bases for regulation.
Furthermore, although the constitutional basis for a law is not necessarily the
same as, or included within, a law’s text, the recent requirement in the Rules of
United States House of Representatives that a “Constitutional Authority
Statement”208 accompany every bill effectively ensures the choice serve an
expressive function relevant to statutory interpretation. Reliance on the Property
Clause, instead of, or, more likely, in addition to, the Commerce Clause, changes
that expression. A body of climate change law that explicitly concerns itself with
regulating not just economic activity but land use activity would root twenty-firstcentury environmental policy in foundational, pre-founding-era natural law
principles of common resource allocation. So-rooted, new climate laws would
appropriately focus on intergenerational equity and ecosystem resilience, in addition
to, not necessarily in lieu of, carbon markets, jobs, and international trade.
Second, additional constitutional authority may be necessary to insulate future
climate legislation from judicial review. Addressing climate change—both through
mitigation and adaptation—will be a monumental lift that will touch nearly every
facet of modern life and every part of society. Just look at the sweeping nature of
the proposed “Green New Deal”; completing that policy agenda would require
multiple statutes that reach beyond traditional environmental law. Any climaterelated legislation that actually passes will inevitably face challenge in the federal
courts. Reliance on more than just the permissive Commerce Clause jurisprudence
would be a wise strategy in the face of such challenge. Indeed, a growing number of
scholars have revisited the Commerce Clause justifications for comprehensive
regulation of the environment, suggesting that even existing laws might not survive
a modern Commerce Clause analysis.209 That is particularly true given the
207

See PURDY, supra note 120, at 137–38 (2010) (Asserting that “[c]limate change
might have been designed to confound the modern political economy” and describing how
conventional approaches to environmental and economic policy will likely fail to mitigate
it).
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See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 17, at 621 (“A bill or joint
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See, e.g., James R. May, Healthcare, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis Under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Tax and Spending Clauses,
43 ENV’T. L. 233, 247 (2013); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27
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documented unease of some Supreme Court justices with what they perceive as
impermissible intrusion on free markets and personal liberty.210 The current
composition of the Court makes the work of these environmental scholars prescient
and foreboding.
Offering the Property Clause as a constitutional basis for climate legislation, at
least as an alternative justification,211 would force the Court to consider the issue in
the context of an entirely different jurisprudence. That doctrine has in modern times
recognized the nearly unlimited power of Congress to protect federal lands and is
rooted in a historical acknowledgment of the importance of preserving common
resources for the collective good. Despite the originalist and textual arguments put
forward in this work in favor of a broad interpretation of the Property Clause, it
seems unlikely the current Court would use the Clause to sanction legislation it
perceived as overly intrusive on economic liberty. Notwithstanding a happy surprise
upholding a climate statute on a constitutional provision outside of the Commerce
Clause,212 adding a Property Clause justification to climate change legislation has
value. It nonetheless would bolster the overall argument in favor of constitutionality
and force the Court to confront the catastrophic realities of climate change for federal
resources.

HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 1, 66 (2003); John C. Eastman, A Fistful of Denial: The Supreme
Court Takes a Pass on Commerce Clause Challenges to Environmental Laws, 2003 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 469, 469; see also Schmitt, supra note 6, at 194 (“Clean air, clean water, and
even biodiversity all have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, at least in the
aggregate. Since the Court limited the reach of the Commerce Clause to economic activity
in Lopez, however, there has been considerable academic debate over whether these laws
remain fully justified. Environmental legislation is often not commercial in nature and
sometimes regulates activities that appear to be no more economic than the conduct at issue
in Lopez or Morrison.”).
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See Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE, (June 29, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-thesupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/6JD8-S9NU] (discussing how Lochner-era thinking
might return to the Supreme Court); see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012); Appel, supra note 7, at 2 (“Until recently, most scholars believed that Congress
possessed almost unlimited power under the Commerce Clause, 10 making it unnecessary to
explore other constitutional foundations for federal legislation.”).
211
The two clauses are not entirely at odds. On the contrary, property rights historically
constituted some of the earliest value items of commerce. The theoretical connection
between property rights and free markets is beyond the scope of this work. For one informed
perspective on this foundational chicken-and-egg conundrum see PURDY, supra note 120, at
115–16 (2010) (“The difficulty is that conceptually and practically, markets do not come
first: property comes first . . . .”).
212
Cf. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause justification for the so-called “individual mandate” in the
Affordable Care Act, but then upholding the provision as a proper exercise of Congress’s
taxing authority).
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Third, an important thread of climate scholarship and litigation has argued that
the public trust doctrine compels the government to address climate change.213
Legislative reliance on the Property Clause, the constitutional expression of the
public trust obligation, would tie the theories of climate action together. Notably,
there has been some dispute in the aforementioned litigation over the existence of a
federal public trust doctrine at all and, if one exists, where in the Constitution it
derives from. The Supreme Court in PPL Montana suggested that the obligations
imposed by the public trust doctrine are a matter of state law,214 and some federal
courts, most notably the D.C. Circuit, have interpreted that dicta as foreclosing any
recognition of a federal public trust that encompasses the atmosphere.215 Neither the
Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit, however, considered the historical argument
put forward above that the substantive content of the Property Clause
constitutionally embedded the natural law principle of a public trust over common
natural resources. Indeed, even the most successful public trust litigation to date has
instead tied the public trust obligation to the Fifth and Ninth Amendments216—more
attenuated connections. Congressional action explicitly drawing on Property Clause
authority to protect public trust resources would serve as recognition by one co-equal
branch that the Constitution entrusted the federal government to protect common
resources. Thus, even a relatively mild piece of climate legislation, so rooted in the
Property Clause, could provide support to those urging federal courts to compel the
federal government to comprehensively address climate change as a matter of a
constitutional public trust obligation.
CONCLUSION
History, text, and precedent reveal an as-yet underutilized source of
constitutional authority for environmental protection. Set apart from the other
legislative powers, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2—the Property Clause—entrusts
213

See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2020); see also
OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/ [https://perma.cc/E4MJ-DPT3]
(last visited July 24, 2021); see also Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 18 PACE ENV’T. L.
REV. 227, 244–46 (2001) (explaining how the public trust doctrine applies to the
atmosphere).
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Under accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the
scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law determines
riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine.”).
215
See Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The
Supreme Court in PPL Montana, however, repeatedly referred to ‘the’ public trust doctrine
and directly and categorically rejected any federal constitutional foundation for that doctrine,
without qualification or reservation.” (citing PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1234–35)).
216
See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165 (“[T]he [district] court held that the plaintiffs had
stated a public trust claim grounded in the Fifth and the Ninth Amendments.”).
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Congress with the sacred task of protecting our collective resources with needful
regulation. We stand confronted with “the most pressing environmental challenge
of our time.”217 It would do a disservice to the principles of the Founders, and frankly
to all of humanity, if we willingly neglected to utilize all of the tools at our disposal.
That is especially true when the heretofore overlooked tool fits the task in purpose,
scope, and theoretical design.
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